· Al-Ugaili had offences and violations under the investigators’ scope;
· Sought to exploit CoI to build personal glory;
· Appointed sentenced and criminals in important positions to extort citizens and officials;
· Turned one of CoI buildings to a private prison run by his orders;
· Reached the extent of illegally determining detention periods;
· Ignored the government and the legislative authority, and issued a book under the title (The Law of Fighting Corruption);
· Recruited himself for serving the American Embassy, and provided it with reports about CoI activities;
· Deliberately deceived the state, people, and international organizations; with exaggerated statistics about the performance of the Commission;
· Covered up corrupts by not reporting them;
· Created a corruption-encouraging and integrity-ousting environment.
The worst reformers or reform advocates, when they themselves are far away from reform, and when they take their case as means for violation, and deceive people by falsifying facts, or use half-truths to suit their personal ambitions, fantasies, and aspirations to the detriment of the case they declare to defend and claim to adhere to. Also when they work on deceiving people by reversing facts to come with their imaginations, and claim to be doing what they are actually not, and work on the contrary to what they announce. The Commission of Integrity (CoI) did not have the desire to reach such a debate with individuals whom facts have proved having cruel intentions, and deceiving public opinion by acting as the victim. Meanwhile, they were practicing the executioner`s role for a long time. Patriotism for them was only a commodity to deceive people; professionalism was a way to sabotage an institution on which hopes are built, and responsibility was a base of personal glory.
It is the former Commissioner Raheem Al-Ugaili, who is included by the Law of Accountability and Justice for his past affiliation to the defunct Al-Baath party. He took over CoI chairmanship for a four-year term which is considered as one of the longest terms in comparison to those who preceded him in undertaking this task; it was followed by another term under the responsibility of the deputy commissioner. He continued with the morals of his Baathist affiliation, using practices and behaviors that are far from professionalism.
His insistence in reversing the truth, falsely accusing the commission with this untrue allegation, incitement against CoI, and the repetition of these lies, all made us adopt his way in responding. He admitted that he was incapable of offering what people wished for from a foundation that fights corruption, corrupts, and preserves public money.
He misused the case of integrity in the worst form, taking CoI as means to abuse its case trying to build personal glory, and damage the reputation of the Iraqi state. Also violating the constitution, the law and, citizens’ rights, and representing more than one role to corrupt CoI under the subterfuge of integrity, and the concern for its case.
One of these serious practices of Raheem Al-Ugaili; former commissioner of CoI, was providing one of the foreign embassies with weekly reports concerned with private information related to the Investigations Office, and included information, investigation stages, arrest warrants, referred cases, criminal cases , and a number of a (100) reports.
He never stopped providing the embassy until he left CoI leadership. This prompted the supreme judicial council, in a response to a CoI letter no. (U,M,4/593/4794), in 26/8/2012 to describe Al-Ugaili as an accused according to item (331) of Penal Code.
The Central Investigation Court has decided to take legal action against the former commissioner of CoI, Raheem Hassan AL-Ugaili pursuant to item (331 of the Iraqi Penal Code) due to providing the American Embassy with reports about the works of CoI Investigation Office.
One of his legally condemned practices was the misuse of his position and keeping documents related to CoI work, including contractual infractions to provincial projects for the year 2010. Contracts of ministries and entities nonrelated to a ministry, it also includes names of parliament members for the current and previous terms, with the contributing and establishing persons, and their families. This led to the waste of the opportunity to pursue those accused of corruption, and the use of those documents for unannounced purposes by him. Currently, Mr. Raheem Al-Ugaili has showed up crying about the situation of corruption and confessing his inability to face it.
Moreover, he worked on transforming the CoI into a security institution similar to the (General Security Directorate), according to the description of his associates in the governorship of public security, built a detention facility for himself and issued orders to organize the work in it, violating the provisions of the constitution, the law, and human rights. Besides, he employed previously convicted persons, impersonators, and certificate forgers in important sectors of CoI.
He issued the ministerial order no. (office/1039 in 28/2/2011) regarding the imprisonment of detainees in the building of Witness Protection building in the International Zone) and vested keeping the detainees with his decision; many of the accused males and females were detained for months. He violated by that the provisions of the constitution and the valid laws that stipulate detention for a limited period is vested with the decision of the investigation judge. Whereas housing detainees is vested with the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and Labor and Social Affairs concerning juveniles. Security cameras were installed to monitor the detainees under Al-Ugaili’s work and supervision. He placed previously convicted persons, sentenced, and impersonators to be responsible for monitoring operations, including his brother-in-law (Qassim Obaies).
He overburdened the treasury massive amounts of money in order to feed and accommodate detainees, while crying for the people`s rights, and raising the voice to lift oppression he practiced by violating the law and pretending to be the victim that defends the rights and hopes of people in a dignified life that he wasted for being a commissioner of CoI. He confessed more than once that he failed to fight corruption in the four years of his chairmanship. It is reasonable that failure was his own ally with his improper behavior, and deviation from the correct administration from which he created a source to employ previously convicted persons and terrorists pursuant to judicial judgment or corrupted according to courts decisions, to form an inner circle for him in administrating important sectors in CoI. Like (Mohammed Al- Uqabi) who is sentenced for six years due to the crime of theft according to the provisions of item (444 of the Iraqi Penal Code) issued by Al-Risafa Juvenile Court. He was released for being included by the decision of Baathist coexistence in 1998, lawsuit no. 446/e/96 approved and appealed by the head of the Cassation Court in 25/3/1997. This is the person defended by Rahim Al-Ugaili after assigning him with the responsibilities for the Special Operations Unit in CoI.
He strongly defended him and described him as a symbol deserves monument. He claims that he`s pursued for his heroic role in fighting corruption, though he impersonated a judge, and practiced shameful behaviors.
Court decisions were issued to arrest him for crimes he committed. Therefore, he escaped in fear of being caught by justice. Al-Ugaili’s brother-in-law, Qassim Obais is also sentenced for ten years for a crime of impersonation. Rahim Al-Ugaili and the so called Qassim Obais deliberately concealed this information while filling the form of his employment. He assigned him with sensitive responsibilities in the Central Support Unit to implement arrest warrants although CoI is not specialized in implementing such orders that belong to the law implementing entities (Ministry of Interior). He also brought (Shaheed Hameed Fayad) who is accused of terrorism cases and wanted by justice into CoI besides assigning (Galib Al-Daami) for the position of Assistant Director General by using his position and employing the mentioned above though he`s wanted by the Iraqi judiciary for terrorism cases as well as hired at CoI and simultaneously being a member of the provincial council at that time.
Raheem Al- Ugaili used his position in hiding information about reports concerning corruption that damages public money for which he falsely cries, and pretends to defend. In this respect, we refer to the report no. (2005/ C,G/1359) which has disappeared for unknown reasons in spite of its great importance in discovering administrative and financial corruption cases.
By this, Al-Ugaili has contributed in giving corrupts an opportunity to damage public money and evade punishment. That report scandalizes companies implementing false works in coordination with Bagdad`s Water Directorate in Abu-Gareb area, which refers to more than 20 works. Al-Ugaili has kept these reports until now for unknown reasons, knowing that an investigation committee has been formed for this matter.
Al-Ugaili went too far in using his position and kept thousands of reports received by CoI concerning practices related to certain persons. With that, he violated the order no. (55) In 2004, contradicting his duties and CoI works. His attitude was not consistent with his position as head of CoI whose work requires neutrality despite the existence of a letter from the Chief of Public Prosecutor no. 31(6/9/2007/10336) in (Oct-10th, 2010) indicates that the CoI is not entitled to keep or stop the reported tip. As a result, the CoI became, during his term, an instrument at the hands of a group that can escape the judgment of law and has the ability to drive reports and complaints against its opponents through Al-Ugaili’s selective behavior towards reports and complaints.
CoI former Commissioner, Raheem Al-Ugaili, worked to turn CoI, during that period, as a pulpit to create a personal glory and achieve his own goals, pulling the Commission away from its field of competence and intercalating it into a political game within which he is a party. He was the one who brought damage upon the reputation of CoI and affected its level of performance. Al-Ugaili’s illusion reached into a level where he believed he could supersede the legislative authorities appointed by the Constitution through granting himself the authority to enact laws. Subsequently, he published his book under the title (The Law of Fighting Corruption) which had not been vetted as a bill, discussed or presented to a legislative authority in the country. He started distributing the book in gatherings, local and international conferences, and workshops in and outside Iraq. Moreover, he instructed some employees to distribute it as Iraq’s Law of Fighting Corruption, which is contrary to the fact. By that, he was exploiting the public office in terms of inflicting the public money with unjustifiable losses.
Raheem Al-Ugaili’s behavior, during the period in which he was chairing the Commission, was characterized by audacity over specialty and stepping into violations without caring either about the saucity of the Iraqi state or the competence of the Commission he was heading, or even his position as a judge. He reached an extent where he started dealing with the U.S. embassy; approving and receiving surveillance and tapping equipment to be used in special operations and tapping processes. Additionally, he approved purchasing devices from the local markets, and performing seizing operations illegally without the consent of the Iraqi competent authorities.
Al-Ugaili had put the equipment mentioned above under the disposal of his inner circle, such as (Mohammed Al-Uqabi) to be used for personal purposes and to extort not only the other Iraqi institutions’ employees, but also the employees of the Commission itself. Thus, Al-Ugaili had involved, in his spying methods - the State’s high level officials, CoI employees and the detainees in the prison he made. By that, he was exploiting his position and his inner circle’s personnel who had been previously convicted of criminal activities, and creating alliances contrary to integrity in more than one way, such as concealing information, reserving reports selectively and covering up corrupts by hiding the reports that come against them.
Al-Ugaili’s objective, specially through dealing with CoI’s reports that are supposed to be clear and transparent, was to create a corruption-encouraging and integrity-ousting environment, including the exaggeration of the annual report’s statistics, as well as increasing the number of claims and assuming a larger and inexact number to the sentenced and referred persons in corruption cases. The evident example to that is making the number of claims against the ministers accused with corruption as the same number of ministers, rather than making a precise description to the condition, which was a method he used in international meetings too, as he is using it currently at the local media.
CoI had to, through this declaration, to deviate from the course of contexts it has followed in dealing with media. It was also due to Al-Ugaili’s insistence and persistence in accusing CoI, in addition to his repetition to those accusations. Here, we point out that all what is mentioned in this statement concerning Al-Ugaili’s violations that are regarded as criminalized actions by law, and which were resulted from a supreme committee’s recommendations, formed to assess CoI’s present and past performance. The committee was consisted of several judicial, oversight and executive parties headed by the Chair of the Judicial Supervision Commission. It has concluded to lay down several recommendations, including the establishment of investigative committees. (A copy of its recommendations is attached) and now being proceeded before the judiciary which has the final word in convicting or acquitting him. However, we assert that they represent tangible facts cast their shadows over CoI’s work, and we believe that they had led into the deviation from the proper conduct that should be followed by CoI for its being characterized by professionalism, neutrality and objectivity. CoI’s method should be submitting everyone to accountability and retribution and that granting infallibility, immunity or sacredness to any job title, including the current CoI chairmanship, employees or any of the former ones, is none of its authority.
The following is the attached recommendations
Third: The recommendations:
Upon the foregoing conclusions, the Committee recommends the following:
With regard to:
1- Utilizing the building that belongs to CoI Witness Protection building as a detention facility for convicts: we recommend to forming an investigative committee to mark out the delinquency within, along with a reference that the current CoI chairmanship has prohibited using this building as a jail, pursuant to the circulated note, no. (Office/ 745) in Feb- 21st, 2012;
2- Receiving and purchasing cameras as well as equipment of surveillance and tapping, with no test, by CoI, and without proper approvals: we recommend to activating the committees mentioned in the ministerial order, no. (U.W/ 347) in Jan- 17th, 2012, issued by CoI to form two investigation committees, and two other committees to inventory and test those equipment. We also recommend to accelerating the formation of those committees to take the necessary steps with the violation mentioned, in accordance with the law;
3- The cars at the building that belongs to CoI Witness Protection Department and in other locations, which are considered as exhibits in cases being investigated by CoI: we recommend to putting an end to this issue if their cases reach the final decision;
4- Providing the U.S. embassy with periodical reports at the time of CoI former chairmanship: we recommend to establishing an investigative committee to determine the delinquency, with an emphasis on following the proper procedures in this regard;
5- Reserving reports, given the lack of a legal basis in the order no. (55. 2004) for this subject by CoI former chairmanship: we recommend to reviewing the reserved reports to check on whither it was right to reserve them or not.
CoI Commissioner is entitled to reserve reports without presenting them to the investigation judge, and in order to ensure the implementation of item (II) of the article mentioned above which has entitled the investigation judge to request any reserved report in accordance with item (I) of the same article, and take what he finds appropriate in this regard: we recommend CoI to setting a detailed periodical inventory for the reserved reports, and to provide them to the relevant investigation judge, along with the instructions intended to be issued by the committee formed in CoI according to the previously mentioned ministerial order (U.W/6758. 17/11/2011);
6- Releasing publications by CoI, in the past, in an unstudied and excessive manner: we recommend to forming an ad hoc committee by CoI to study the feasibility of CoI releases in terms of quality and quantity so that to ensure the proper utilization of CoI resources in publishing the culture of integrity and fighting corruption. Moreover, it is necessary for CoI to be precise in labeling its publications and to edify the internal and external public opinion about the laws, regulations and instructions concerning the fight against terrorism;
7- Releasing statements by CoI former chairmanship, as well as publishing and providing media outlets with imprecise, incorrect and exaggerated information about the size of corruption cases and the accused of them: we recommend CoI to: maintaining precision, credibility and neutrality in practicing the work charted for it by law; leaving away defamation and media exaggeration to the size of corruption; depending the provisions that reach the final decision in charges; and highlighting CoI’s media edifying role to publicize the culture of integrity in society. We, as well, recommend that the opinion of CoI former Commissioner does not represent the opinion of CoI and the other oversight bodies;
8- Implementing the arrest warrants through the Central Support Unit: we recommend that the arrest warrants, against the wanted and accused of cases being investigated by CoI, are implemented by the concerned parties (Police stations), and to abolish the ministerial order no. (office/843) in Feb- 28th, 2010, which had assigned the previously mentioned unit with implementing warrants;
9- CoI employees: we recommend to reassessing them by the Commission to ensure making useful administrative improvements that allow the incorrupt and competent elements to occupy the positions and withhold the appropriate tasks, and transfer those who are not characterized by that into the outside of the Commission.
10- Delegating CoI employees: we recommend CoI to choosing the delegations that contribute to developing the competence and enhancing the expertise of its employees. And as well, to selecting elements on the basis of objective standards and upon the delegates’ competence and specialty, and the delegation’s theme;
11- Keeping documents and relevant papers of CoI’s work by the former Commissioner: the Committee finds it contrary to law, and recommends to forming an investigative committee in this regard;
12- The investigative committee formed by the ministerial order no. (Office/4624) in Oct-20th, 2011, to investigate the information and complaints raised against the former Director of CoI Special Operations’ Department (Mohammed Ali Abdul Hussein Al-Uqabi), and regarding the committee’s recommendations on the file of surveillance, wiretapping, recording phone calls and requesting the relevant information, as well as the file of reserving reports and the related papers, and deleting Special Operations Department’s data and files from computers: we recommend to being in favor of the procedures and recommendations of the investigation committee mentioned earlier. We also recommend the committee to complementing the investigation processes regarding the deleted data and files;
13- BSA’s report regarding CoI: we recommend CoI to pursuing it with BSA to ensure the correction of CoI’s work and over passing the remarks noted within.
Forth: Evaluation:
Through what is mentioned earlier, it is apparent that CoI, with its new chairmanship has over passed many of the disadvantages referred to in this report, including: the abolishment of all orders and instructions of using the building that belongs to the Witness Investigation Department as a detention facility for the accused personnel; cessation of providing U.S. embassy with weekly reports, and approaching the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to get its opinion in this regard; formation of an investigation committee to implement CoI law no. (30), in 2012; issuance of a ministerial order to implement the recommendations of the investigation committee formed to investigate the information and complaints submitted against the former Director of the Special Operations Department; instruction of establishing four committees regarding surveillance and tapping equipment received from the American side; investigation by CoI in the rest of complaints and information raised against the party referred to earlier; and the establishment of three new offices: the Office of Extradition; Office of Researches and Studies; and the Iraqi Anti Corruption Academy, by the virtue of the valid law. We find that all what is mentioned above, in addition to the implementation of this committee’s recommendation, are key elements to the development of CoI’s work.
The foregoing report is concluded and signed by the Committee’s members in Feb-28th, 2012.
